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Since the seminal work by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), various attempts have
been made to calculate optimal tax rates for different countries (e.g. Deaton
(1977) for the UK and Harris and McKinnon (1979) for Canada). Other
exercises along these lines are studies by Ebrahimi and Heady (1988), who
examine the sensitivity of optimal tax rates to assumptions regarding separability
and the availability of optimal demogrants, and those of Fukushima (1991) and
Fukushima and Hatta (1989), who examine the welfare implications of a move to
uniform taxation.
The calculation of optimal tax rates imposes quite severe informational
requirements.
2 For example, it is necessary to specify explicit utility functions
for agents as well as the distribution of income (or whichever variable
households are ranked over). Demand responses also have to be evaluated for
individual households at the optimum, a point which may be quite far away from
the current position of the economy. In addition, optimal tax calculations require
estimates of how behavioural responses themselves change in response to taxes
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and/or redistributions of income (i.e. knowledge of the second derivatives of
demand functions and hence the third derivatives of utility functions).
Such informational difficulties can severely compromise the policy relevance
of optimal tax design. A potentially more rewarding approach is that of marginal
tax reform, with the seminal paper in this area by Ahmad and Stern (1984). This
approach has the considerable advantage of not requiring the choice of explicit
utility functions, nor an explicit model of the distribution of expenditure, but
instead merely requires information on the actual position of the economy at a
single point in time, using actual consumptions, actual distributions of
expenditure, and aggregate rather than individual demand responses for the
current situation of the economy.
Ahmad and Stern (1984, hereinafter referred to as AS) examined indirect tax
reform for India. This model addressed tax reform using a measure that they
called the marginal social cost (MSC) of raising revenue via an increase in the
tax on a specific good. Optimality requires that the MSC be equal for all goods.
If the MSCs are not equal, then directions of tax reform at the margin can be
identified. The tax on the good with a higher MSC should be lowered while that
on the good with the lower MSC should be raised. The actual expression for
MSC is the ratio of a welfare effect and a revenue effect, and its calculation
requires information on household demands for goods, tax rates, welfare weights
and price responses. AS then present calculations of MSC for the Indian
economy and identify directions of indirect tax reform at the margin. Similar
calculations to those of AS have been carried out for Norway (Christiansen and
Jansen, 1978), Belgium (Decoster and Schokkaert, 1990), Canada (Cragg, 1991),
Germany (Kaiser and Spahn, 1989), Italy (Brugiavini and Weber, 1988) and
Pakistan (Ahmad and Stern, 1991).
This paper extends the AS methodology and applies it to a study of the Irish
indirect tax system. It builds upon previous work by the author (Madden, 1989),
but differs from that work in a number of crucial respects. First, from a
methodological point of view this paper addresses a problem that can arise with
the MSC measure introduced by AS. It shows that their MSC measure is not a
continuous measure and argues that the reciprocal of MSC is a preferable
measure. Second, this study looks at indirect tax reform for both 1980 and 1987,
3
thus permitting analysis of the tax reforms that the model suggests would have
been welfare-improving in 1980. Third, this study incorporates family size and
equivalence scales into the distribution of expenditures. It also addresses the
issue of the degree of inequality aversion implicit in the indirect tax system.
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Finally, this study uses a substantially different and, it is believed, more reliable
set of demand responses.
4
The layout of this paper is as follows. Section II describes the basic model of
marginal indirect tax reform. Section III briefly discusses the data, while Section
IV gives a short account of developments in indirect taxes in Ireland over the
period under discussion. Section V presents and discusses the results for derived
tax reforms, while Section VI discusses a related issue known as the inverse
optimum problem. Section VII offers some concluding comments.
II. THE BASIC MODEL OF TAX REFORM
The marginal tax reform approach lies very much within the traditional optimal
tax literature but takes a different starting-point. Rather than attempting to derive
those tax rates that minimise welfare loss for the collection of a given revenue
(raising the various difficulties outlined in Section I), the approach takes the
existing tax system as given and identifies directions of tax reform at the margin.
Tax reform is thus potentially of more relevance to the policymaker than is
optimal tax design.
This approach concentrates on consumer welfare and the government revenue
constraint. In this paper, we examine the indirect tax system only, although this
model can be extended to incorporate direct taxation and labour supply.
5 The
crucial parameter of the AS model is what they call the marginal social cost
(MSC) of taxation of each good. If we increase the tax on good i, we have a
change in welfare, !V/!ti. We also have a change in revenue, !R/!ti. The ratio of
these two measures gives the marginal social cost of raising one unit of revenue
from increasing the tax on good i.
6 Thus AS define the MSC, "i, as
(1)
where we insert the minus sign to denote marginal cost. It is intuitively obvious
that at the optimum, the marginal cost of raising funds from different sources
should be the same, i.e. all the "i should be equal, since otherwise we could raise
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the tax on a good with low MSC and lower the tax on a good with high MSC,
thus increasing welfare for no change in revenue.
As can be seen from equation (1), the expression for "i is the ratio of a
welfare effect, !V/!ti , and a revenue effect, !R/!ti.  !V/!ti will always be
negative. In general, we would expect !R/!ti to be positive, but, in principle, it
can be greater than, less than or equal to zero (the case of !R/!ti < 0 could be
regarded as a commodity-specific Laffer effect).
7 This can have implications for
the value of "i, since as !R/!ti becomes smaller, "i becomes larger and
approaches infinity in the limit. This introduces a discontinuity into the
relationship between "i and !R/!ti and also raises the question of comparison
between two "is when either or both has a negative value. To overcome these
problems and avoid any question of discontinuity, we propose that goods be
ranked according to 1/"i (which for convenience we will refer to as $i) with the
general recommendation that if $i < $j, then the indirect tax on good i should be
lowered and that on good j should be raised. Intuitively, $i gives the marginal
cost in revenue forgone when a tax is lowered so as to provide one extra unit in
welfare (we can call this the marginal revenue cost, MRC). Note that the
existence of negative $i does not complicate our rule. In making a pairwise
comparison between any two goods, i and j, the principle ‘lower ti if $i < $j’ is
always robust to whatever sign $i and $j  take.
8
We need to find an expression for $i that is readily calculable. As can be seen
from Appendix A, it can be shown that
(2)
where  qi is the consumer (i.e. tax-inclusive) price of good i,  xi
h is the
consumption of good i by household h, XI = %h xi
h is the total consumption of
good i, &
h is the welfare weight for household h, ’k is the tax on good k as a
proportion of consumer price and (ki is the uncompensated cross-price elasticity
of good k with respect to good i. Thus equation (2) gives an expression for $i
which is readily calculable from available data.
The decomposition of $i in equation (2) also gives an intuitive understanding
of the marginal social cost of increasing the tax on a good. $i represents the
revenue cost at the margin of generating an extra unit of welfare via a reduction
in ti. It comprises two components, the first involving only household demands
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and welfare weights, and the second involving, in addition, taxes and aggregate
demand responses. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the
reciprocal of the ‘distributional characteristic’ of the good (see Feldstein (1972)
for a more detailed discussion). If we have a strong aversion to inequality, then
the welfare weights, &
h, will differ significantly and be relatively larger for
poorer households. This term could then play an important role in the ranking of
$i across goods, as the dominant contribution to it would be the reciprocal of the
share in total consumption of good i by the poorest groups. If we are not
concerned with distributional issues and give equal welfare weights to each
household, say &
h = 1, then this term will be unity for all goods and so will not
contribute to the ranking of $i across goods. The second term in equation (2)
involves the effect of demand responses on revenue.
III. DATA REQUIREMENTS
We wish to obtain estimates of $i for Ireland using expression (2). The data
required are the following: data on household expenditure of goods, xi
h, which
are obtained from the Irish Household Budget Survey (HBS); welfare weights,
&
h, which will be discussed below; tax rates, ’k, which can be obtained from
Revenue Commissioners’ Reports; and demand responses, which can be
obtained from estimates of aggregate demand systems. Madden (1993a) provides
a comprehensive set of demand responses using a variety of models. For the
purposes of this paper, it was decided to use an Almost Ideal Demand System
(AIDS) model estimated in first differences.
9 The period of estimation was
1958–88 and 10 goods were included: food, alcohol, tobacco, clothing and
footwear, fuel and power, petrol, transport and equipment (including travelling
within the state), durables, other goods, and services. For estimation purposes,
services were treated as a residual.
One point that should be stressed here is that the analysis is strictly marginal.
We do not need estimates of demand and utility functions for individual
household groups. For a marginal reform, the only data needed on individual
households are their consumption levels, since these tell us what the utility
consequences of marginal changes would be. To estimate the demand and
revenue effects, all that are needed are the aggregate demand responses.
10
                                                                                                                                   
9 The demand estimates obtained, and hence the calculated values of the $i, will obviously depend upon the
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For the purposes of discussion of our results, we need to explain the
derivation of the welfare weights. These are introduced exogenously, but are




h is the total expenditure per equivalent adult of the hth household, e is a
parameter reflecting inequality aversion and k is chosen for purposes of
normalisation. In Madden (1989), total expenditure per household was used as
the I variable. However, this ignores the fact that higher-spending households are
typically larger households and so the distribution of expenditure on a ‘per
equivalent adult basis’ may be different from that on the basis of purely total
expenditure. Expenditure per equivalent adult is used here, and the equivalence
scales used were obtained from Conniffe and Keogh (1988). As it turns out, the
introduction of equivalence scales makes relatively little difference to the
ranking of goods by MRC, although, as would be expected, their introduction
tends to reduce the variance of expenditure.
11 We disaggregate household
expenditure by decile.
Given our expression for U
h(I
h) above, we have &
h = U
h(I
h) where ’ denotes
the first derivative, and we choose a normalisation for &
h through choice of k, so






1 is expenditure per equivalent adult for the poorest household.
Thus &
h can be viewed as representing the marginal social value of a unit of
expenditure to group h relative to a unit to group 1. In the case of zero inequality
aversion, e = 0 and &
h = 1 for all h. If e > 0, then &
h < 1, so that increments of
expenditure to the poor are seen to have a higher marginal social value than
those to the rich. The ratio &
1/&
h increases with e for I
1 < I
h, and so e can be
regarded as an inequality aversion parameter. We have included a number of
values for e in the results presented in this paper. A value of e = 1 implies that a
marginal unit of expenditure to group h is worth half as much as a marginal unit
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correspondence are given in Appendix B.
11 Note that the distributional issue being discussed here is distribution of expenditure rather than distribution
of welfare. Ideally, we would like to have some measure of welfare to take account of the fact that higher-
spending households may also work longer hours and so the difference in household welfare may be less than
that in household expenditure. Such household welfare information is very difficult to obtain. Note also that
our welfare weights are independent of prices. This is a local approximation which is suitable for marginal
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to group 1 if the expenditure of group h is twice that of group 1. A value of e = 5
approaches the extreme Rawlsian case of only considering the welfare of the
poorest.
12
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN INDIRECT TAXATION IN IRELAND, 1980–87
Since we are comparing marginal tax reform in 1980 and 1987, it is useful to
check on the major changes in tax rates and expenditure patterns over the period.
Before analysing this issue, it is worth noting that the 1980–87 period is an
unusually interesting period in recent Irish economic history. The decade of the
1980s saw dramatic changes in indirect taxes as successive governments
addressed very high levels of exchequer borrowing and an escalating debt/GNP
ratio. Table 1 shows our calculated indirect tax rates as they stood in 1980 and
1987. A detailed discussion of the changes in tax rates is presented in Appendix
C, but broadly speaking we can identify tax increases in almost all categories of
goods, with the exception of transport and equipment.
The other important change over the period is in spending patterns. Here we
have to be careful to distinguish between spending patterns as given in the HBS
and those derived from National Accounts data, from which the elasticities are
obtained. The correspondence between the two disaggregations has been made
as close as possible but is still not exact.
13
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Table 2 gives the change in spending patterns on both a National Accounts
and a Household Budget Survey basis. It shows that the major shift in spending
has been towards services and other goods and away from food, durables,
transport and equipment, and fuel and power. Given the expressions for
elasticities in the AIDS model ((ij = .ij/wI – /ij, where .ij is a parameter from the
estimating equation, wi is the budget share of good i and /ij is the Kronecker
delta), this implies that services’ and other goods’ cross-elasticities with respect
to the other commodities will fall in absolute value, while their own-price
elasticities could rise or fall.
14
V. CALCULATED MRCS FOR 1980 AND 1987
We will now discuss the results obtained from calculating values of $i for 1980
and 1987. As we have seen above, the values of $i calculated will depend upon
both distributional and efficiency factors. Before presenting the values of $i, it
may be useful to try to isolate the distributional factors by calculating the
‘distributional characteristic’ of the different goods for 1980 and 1987. These are
shown in Tables 3 and 4, and are the values of the reciprocal of $i obtained when
we impose the condition that all uncompensated own- and cross-price elasticities
are zero, i.e. (ij  = 0 for all values of i and j. Thus they are equal to 1/$I =
                                                                                                                                   
13 The good with the greatest discrepancy is alcohol. This presumably reflects the under-reporting of alcohol
consumption typical in survey-based data.
14 More formally, !(ii/!wi = .ii/wi




h/Xi. This measure summarises the variation of consumption patterns
across income classes by weighting the market shares of the different households
in the consumption of commodity i, using the &
h as weights. These weights
depend on the value of e, the inequality aversion parameter. When e = 0 (i.e.
there is no inequality aversion), they are all equal to one, i.e. 1/$i  = Xi/Xi. As e
increases, necessities get a relatively higher and luxuries a relatively lower value
for the distributional characteristic, since consumption by less well-off
households is receiving a relatively higher weight in the expression for the
numerator of 1/$i. Thus taking 1980, for example, if we were willing to neglect
efficiency considerations and had a value of e  = 2, our policy prescriptions
would be to lower the taxes on fuel and power, tobacco, and food, and to raise
the taxes on services, transport and equipment, and durables. Note also that in
1980, fuel and power consistently had the highest distributional characteristic,
while in 1987, tobacco’s was the highest for values of e = 1 and e = 2. This
suggests that tobacco consumption became relatively more concentrated amongst
lower- expenditure households over the 1980s.
We now present the calculated values of the individual $i for the two years.
These values indicate the scope for welfare-enhancing tax reform with the tax
reform rule being to raise the tax on the good with the highest $i and lower the
tax on the good with the lowest $j, thus effectively adopting a concertina-type
reform in the $is. Note that this is not necessarily the same as a concertina-typeIndirect Tax Reform in Ireland
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reform in tax rates.
15 Tables 5 and 6 give the rankings of goods by MRC for 1980
and 1987.
The tables are presented for different levels of e, the inequality aversion
parameter, and according to the year in question. To analyse the sensitivity of the
rankings of goods to these different features, we examine rank correlations in
Table 7.
We can briefly summarise the results as follows:
(a) Although we can see the effect of increasing the degree of inequality
aversion through changes in the ranking of goods such as food and fuel
and power, the rank correlations in Table 7 suggest that the rankings, and
thus the tax reform recommendations, show relatively little sensitivity to
the value of e, especially in 1980.
(b) Controlling for the degree of inequality aversion, the rank correlation
between rankings for 1980 and 1987 is in the range 0.7–0.8, suggesting
that tax reform recommendations for both years would have been similar.
The result in (a) is perhaps surprising since it suggests that distributional
considerations matter little in the ranking of goods. This might be explained in
two ways. First, with only 10 household groups differentiated by expenditure per
equivalent adult, there is a relatively tight expenditure distribution and so we do
                                                                                                                                   
15 In fact, it can be shown that when e = 0 and thus &
h = 1 for all h, !$i/!’i = (ii. If (ii < 0, then this implies that
a concertina-type reform in ti is sufficient for a concertina-type reform in $i. Note, however, that the (ii are
uncompensated elasticities and thus even if we impose concavity on the underlying consumer cost function, we
cannot guarantee that (ii < 0.Fiscal Studies
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not pick up very ‘poor’ or very ‘rich’ households, owing to the relatively low
level of disaggregation. There may well be two households in the same group
whose relative rankings of goods by MSC might differ quite significantly for a
relatively low value of e. The second explanation we can offer is that indirect
taxes may be a relatively inefficient means of addressing distributional issues
and reducing inequality (Sah (1983) provides a more theoretical exposition of
this), especially for countries with well-developed direct tax systems and/or
lump-sum grants. For example, were we to calculate the value of $g, the MRCIndirect Tax Reform in Ireland
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for a uniform lump-sum grant, we may find that it has quite a low value relative
to the calculated $i, suggesting that, rather than lower the tax on a good with a
low $i, we could simply increase the value of the grant. Thus for countries that
do have relatively well- developed income tax/social welfare schemes,
distributional issues might be best tackled using these instruments. Stern (1990)
provides an interesting discussion of this area, stressing the relatively
undeveloped direct tax systems which operate in many less-developed
economies.
A further point to remember in examining the rankings in Tables 5 and 6 is
that we have not allowed for external effects associated with the consumption of
various goods. For example, the consumption of goods such as alcohol, tobacco
and petrol may give rise to social costs, which can be reduced by the imposition
of corrective taxes. Since we do not incorporate such effects in this model, it is
possible that the relatively low rankings of goods such as alcohol and tobacco is
explained by this factor.
16
The result in (b) could be interpreted as implying that there was little indirect
tax reform over the 1980–87 period. To check this, we can examine Table 5, see
what the implied tax reforms were and then check back to Table 1 to see whether
the tax reforms were implemented. For the sake of this comparison, we will take
a typical value of e = 2. Table 5 recommended tax increases on such general
categories of goods as other goods, services, food and possibly clothing and
footwear, while tax cuts were recommended for tobacco, fuel and power,
transport and equipment, durables and possibly petrol. (We will neglect the case
of alcohol, since it is the good showing the greatest sensitivity to changes in the
underlying demand system. This is possibly due to greater difficulty in obtaining
reliable elasticity estimates for alcohol because of problems associated with
cross-border trade (see Madden (1993a)).) With the exception of other goods, the
recommended tax increases were put into effect. However, the recommended tax
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cuts were not put into effect; on the contrary, taxes were increased on most of
those goods. This may reflect the fact that the 1980–87 period was one in which
the overall level of taxation in Ireland increased significantly, in response to the
rising public sector indebtedness. At a time when macroeconomic magnitudes
were reaching unsustainable levels, marginal tax reform may have been low on
the government’s list of priorities.
17
VI. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE INVERSE
OPTIMUM
As mentioned above, the deterioration in the Irish public finances during the
1980–87 period may explain why the implied tax reforms of 1980 were not
implemented, for the most part. Another possible consequence of this
concentration upon macroeconomic concerns may have been a neglect of
distributional considerations. An exercise which may throw some light on this is
what is known as the inverse optimum problem. This exercise estimates the
degree of inequality aversion implicit in the tax system under the assumption that
the government is optimising. Thus we calculate the value of e, the coefficient of
inequality aversion, that is consistent with optimality of the existing tax system,
where by optimality we mean that the marginal revenue costs are the same for all
goods, i.e. $i  =  $ for all values of i. Thus we will have 10 expressions for
equation (2), one for each good, with two unknowns, e and $, which can be
estimated via non-linear regression. The results of this exercise are presented in
Table 8, with t-statistics in parentheses.
18
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18 Note that in our estimation of e and r from equation (2), we are treating the eki as observations when in fact
they are estimates which themselves will have standard errors. Thus the t-statistics in Table 8 are overestimates
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The results are somewhat surprising. Recall that e represents a coefficient of
inequality aversion. Its estimated value of 0.360 for 1980 suggests that the
government was mildly inequality-averse. However, the estimated value of –
0.135 for 1987 suggests that the government’s attitude towards inequality as
revealed in the indirect tax system was quite the opposite and that over certain
ranges the social welfare function was ‘regressive’.
19 The other result of interest
concerns the estimated values of $. Recall that $ is the inverse of the overall
marginal social cost of taxation (i.e. it is the inverse of the Lagrange multiplier
of the government’s constrained optimisation problem). Thus a higher value of $
indicates a lower marginal social cost of taxation. The results here indicate that
this marginal social cost of taxation was lower in 1980 than in 1987. Thus there
are two striking results from Table 8 that need explaining: first, that the
government’s attitude towards inequality, as implied by the indirect tax system,
altered quite significantly over the 1980–87 period; and second, that the overall
marginal social cost of taxation rose over the 1980–87 period (presuming, of
course, that the government was optimising during this period).
Before attempting to explain these results, there are a number of qualifying
remarks which have to be made. The first of these concerns the possibility,
discussed above, of external effects in consumption for certain goods. The
incorporation of such effects in our social welfare function would then lower the
implied welfare cost of these taxes and, given the high distributional
characteristic of tobacco, would presumably also increase the implied inequality
aversion. Previous work by the author (Madden, 1994) suggests that such
external effects may be important, although the implied inequality aversion is
still quite low (less than 0.5).
Second, as outlined above, we cannot make inferences about the implied
inequality aversion of the government purely by reference to the indirect tax
system. It is necessary to take into account also the direct tax system and other
fiscal instruments, such as welfare payments.
Third, the comparison of estimated values of e and $ for two different points
in time, in the context of a tax reform exercise, is difficult. We are comparing the
properties of two different equilibria, without directly specifying our welfare
function and thus without being able to say which situation represents the higher
level of welfare. The finding that the overall marginal social cost of taxation was
higher in 1987 than in 1980 does not necessarily imply that global welfare was
lower.
The final point to be noted regarding these estimates concerns the relatively
low t-statistics for the estimates of e. They imply that the standard errors of the
estimates are greater in magnitude than the value of the coefficient, and so the
reliability of inferences based on these estimates is questionable.
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Bearing all these caveats in mind, however, we can still ask whether it is
possible to identify any tax changes over the period which might have caused
these changes in the estimated values of e and $. The change in the estimate of e
would presumably be explained by an increase in the tax rate on a good with a
high distributional characteristic. Examination of Tables 1 and 3 shows that the
taxes on the three goods with the highest distributional characteristics — fuel
and power, tobacco and food — were raised over the period 1980–87.
Meanwhile, the tax on the good with the second-lowest distributional
characteristic, transport and equipment, was lowered (although see Appendix C
concerning the calculation of the tax on this good).
Thus the results from the inverse optimum exercise are consistent with the
view that concentration on macroeconomic issues over the 1980–87 period led to
an overall higher marginal social cost of taxation and lower implied inequality
aversion by the government.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has applied the Ahmad–Stern model of marginal indirect tax reform
to the Irish indirect tax system for the years 1980 and 1987, and has amended
their approach to rank commodities by the marginal revenue cost rather than the
marginal social cost of taxation. It finds that there was considerable scope for
indirect tax reforms at the margin for both 1980 and 1987. The publication of the
1994 Household Budget Survey will allow for further analysis of indirect tax
reform, this time during a period when macroeconomic fiscal issues were much
less pressing. This paper also finds that the estimated degree of inequality
aversion consistent with the existing tax system being optimal was low but
positive in 1980 and negative in 1987.
There are a number of possible extensions to this model. First, in this model
we have analysed indirect taxes independently of decisions regarding labour
supply and the direct tax system. Thus we are implicitly assuming separability
between goods and leisure. Optimal indirect tax recommendations are extremely
sensitive to assumptions regarding separability and the availability of direct
taxes (see Deaton (1981)). As noted above, such effects are incorporated into
models of this sort in Madden (1994) and sensitivity to separability can be
examined. It is also possible to incorporate the stylised fact that some consumers
may be rationed in some markets, particularly the labour market. In the absence
of goods/leisure separability, this could have quite complex effects on tax
reforms (see Madden (1995)).
Second, this analysis has concentrated on marginal reforms and so has not
been able to address issues of global comparisons, either across time or between
situations that involve major changes in the tax regime. This would involve
extensions of this work along the lines of Honohan and Irvine (1987) and King
(1983).Indirect Tax Reform in Ireland
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF EXPRESSION FOR MARGINAL
REVENUE COST
The production side of the model is very simple. Producer prices are fixed and
there are constant returns to scale, with the result that tax increases are reflected
as consumer price increases and there are no pure profits. (See Stern (1987) for a
discussion of the case where tax shifting can be different from 100 per cent.)
20
We assume factor incomes are fixed and thus household utility is a function of
consumer prices, q. There are n goods and t is a vector of specific taxes.
(A1) q = p + t
where p is the fixed producer price vector. There are H households indexed by h
= 1,2,..., H.
Given prices q, the demand of household h, x
h(q), maximises utility, u
h(x
h),
subject to the household budget constraint. Then v
h(q), the indirect utility
function, gives the maximum utility possible at prices q. We assume a Bergson–
Samuelson social welfare function which we can write as a function of prices in
the form




The aggregate demand vector is given by
(A3)
and government tax revenue is given by
(A4)
From Roy’s identity we know that
(A5)
where 0
h is the private marginal utility of income. Then we can say that
(A6)
                                                                                                                                   
20 The assumption of perfectly elastic supply is reasonable for a small open economy such as Ireland, for the
tradables sector at least.
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h is the social marginal utility of income of household h, i.e.
the welfare weight.
From equation (A4) we have
(A7)
Thus, after some rearranging to express in elasticity terms, we have
(A8)
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APPENDIX B: COMMODITY CLASSIFICATION
The analysis was carried out for 10 goods. NIE data for 10 goods were provided
(on the ‘old’ NIE basis as this was the longest continual series with both value
and volume data) and then as close a correspondence as possible with the HBS
was obtained. The following list gives the 10 goods by their NIE classification




Clothing Items 206-258, 330-332
Fuel and power Items 259-270
Petrol Item 359
Transport and equipment and travelling within the state Items 351-374 minus item 359
Durables Items 295-329 minus items 306, 315
Other goods Items 283-294, 333-350
Services Residual
APPENDIX C: PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN INDIRECT TAXES, 1980–87
Over the 1980–87 period, the following major VAT changes took place:
1 May 1980 20% rate raised to 25%.
1 September 1980 10% rate raised to 15%.
1 May 1982 15% and 25% rates raised to 18% and 30% respectively. VAT on books
removed.
1 March 1983 18% and 30% rates raised to 23% and 35% respectively.
1 May 1983 5% rate imposed on zero-rates fuel, excluding electricity.
1 Mat 1984 Clothing for persons aged 11 years or over liable to VAT at 8%.
1 March 1985 Fundamental restructuring with three general rates coming into operation
(zero, 10% and 23%). 10% VAT on adult footwear.
1 March 1986 23% rate increased to 25%.
1 July 1986 Rate of tax on certain services (meals, catering, cinema, repair and
maintenance, laundry and cleaning) reduced from 25% to 10%. Rate on hot
take-aways increased from zero to 10%.
1 July 1987 Rate on certain small number of services reduced from 25% to 10%.
The major changes in taxation over the period can be briefly summarised as
follows. The increase in tax on food reflects the abolition of food subsidies in
1983. The tax on alcohol actually fell, reflecting excise duty increases which did
not keep pace with inflation. This offset the overall increase in the rate of VAT.Fiscal Studies
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Tobacco taxes rose, reflecting excise duty increases greater than inflation and
also higher VAT rates. The tax on clothing and footwear went from zero to 8 per
cent, largely reflecting the fact that this category of goods became eligible for
VAT in 1984. The rise in tax on fuel and power is due to the 5 per cent VAT
introduced on previously zero-rated fuels with the exception of electricity (plus
various excise duties on home heating oils etc.). Petrol shows one of the largest
increases in tax rates, owing to a number of factors. There were increases in
excise duties as well as the increase in VAT rates. However, what probably
contributed most to the rise in the tax as a proportion of the consumer price was
the fall in petrol prices in 1986, and the relative non-indexation of excise duties
after this price fall. The fall in the tax on transport and equipment and travelling
within the state largely reflects an aggregation issue. The bulk of the tax on this
category of aggregated goods arises from the high excise duty on motor vehicles.
Consumption of motor vehicles, as measured by purchases of new motor
vehicles, fell significantly over the period, thus lowering the ex post tax. The
marginal tax changes in the other categories largely reflect changes in various
VAT rates.
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